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Abstract:
The year 2011 has witnessed a lot of high profiles data breaches despite the availability of IS
security and governance controls, frameworks, standards and models for organisations to choose
from; and the technical advances made in intrusion prevention and detection. Taking this issue
into account the objective of this paper is to identify and analyse the weaknesses in the IS
security defences of organisations from a holistic perspective, and propose a dynamic IS security
governance process model for the implementation of appropriate controls and mechanisms for
optimised IS security. Optimization is achieved through the strategic overlap of security and
governance frameworks implemented in a prioritized phased manner for efficiency and
effectiveness in cost, time and effort. The paper starts with the analysis of data breaches to
identify the weaknesses in the organisational information system. This is followed by the
analysis of recommended requirements and dimensions of effective IS security architecture, IS
governance, concepts and models to identify relevant frameworks used in IS security and
governance. Thereafter, the best practices for implementing the model is evaluated and finally
the frameworks and IS entities are integrated into an optimized Information Systems Security
and Governance (ISSG) process model.

Keywords:
IS security governance, IS risk management, security culture, IS security best practices, Data
breaches, COBIT, ITIL, RiskIT, PCI DSS 2.0, ISO 27002

1. Introduction
Information system is critical not only for the efficient and effective functioning of an
organisation, but have also become the custodian of sensitive customer and corporate
information raising legal, regulatory and ethical issues. Hence, any disruption or breach into the
organizational network affects all stakeholders. The embrace of cloud computing and
outsourcing have compounded the security threat since confidential information is stored in
remote servers on the Internet. Morever, the high profile and persistent IS security breaches in
2011 in Sony, the data-security firm RSA, Lockheed Martin, the email wholesaler Epsilon, the
Fox broadcast network, NASA, PBS, the European Space Agency, the FBI, the British and
French treasuries, Citigroup, and other organisations (Liebowitz, 2011) have exposed the
weakness of the current IS security model and architecture, in preventing intrusions into
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organisational networks. These breaches have sent the message that technical controls are not
sufficient to prevent breaches as hackers have found ways to bypass the organizational IS
security defenses by using a combination of social–technical methods.

2. IS Security Breaches
The data breach at RSA, Sony and Epsilon occurred due to spear phishing rather than highly
sophisticated hacking. Spear phishing is a type of attack using a technique commonly known as
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), where the attacks target individual employees rather than
organizational security defenses. One simple flaw or oversight by the employee is all that is
required for entry into these defenses. When it comes to APTs it is not about how safe, secure
and good the company is, but that a totally new approach for entering the organization is selected
where the attacker does not bother to hack the organization and its infrastructure, but rather
focus on hacking the employees and then escalate the privileges. According to a key manager at
RSA, technological advances in IS security and the use of IS security controls/frameworks, and
compliance on IS security regulations have prevented the IS security breaches to a great extent.
However, on March 17th 2011 a data breach occurred in RSA which provides security, risk, and
compliance solutions for most of the Fortune 500 companies for managing their security. Unlike
other data breaches, no customer data like email addresses, usernames, credit card numbers, date
of birth or social security numbers were stolen. The attackers used a common form of phishing
called spear phishing where they sent two different phishing emails over a two-day period. The
two emails were sent to two small groups of lower level employees with the email subject “2011
Recruitment Plan.” The email went to the junk folder, but one employee retrieved it from the
junk mail folder, and open the attached excel file. It was a spreadsheet titled “2011 Recruitment
plan.xls. The spreadsheet contained a zero-day exploit (are exploits for vulnerabilities that are
not yet publicly known) that installed a backdoor through an Adobe Flash vulnerability. The
attacker then proceeded to install a remote administration tool (a variant of Poison Ivy set in
reverse mode) that allows the attacker to control the machine. In this reverse connect mode the
victim machine reaches out and connect to the command and control rather than the other way
around bypassing the firewall state table. Once this was set up, the attacker started digital
shoulder surfing to establish the employee‟s role and their level of access (Rivner, 2011).
According to various sources, the estimated cost to the company through this attack is $ 66
million in direct and attributable costs (ibid). It was revealed that a similar methodology was
used in the case of Sony PlayStation data breach where it was suspected that the hackers used
spear phishing to enter the network and take control of the PC of a system administrator, who
had rights to access sensitive information about Sony's customers. They did that by sending the
administrator an email message that contained a piece of malicious software that got downloaded
onto his or her PC. An analysis of these breaches reveal, that if a few non-technical procedures
were followed, majority of these breaches could have been avoided, pointing to the fact that
relying on technical controls alone may not be effective.
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Statistics on data breaches from various sources point to the severity of the situation. Resources
from these sources are taken and analyzed to view the trend and weaknesses in networks.
Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC, 2011), a not for profit organisation tracking data
breaches in the United States , reported that hacking accounted for the largest number of
breaches in the first quarter of 2011, as almost 37% of breaches were due to malicious attacks on
computer systems which is more than double the amount of targeted attacks (17.1%) reflected in
the 2010 ITRC Breach List. By the end of 2011 (December 31st 2011), there has been 414
reported breaches with 22,945,773 records compromised in 2011, and this does not include the
breaches not reported, veiled from public and unknown. The last five years (2007 to 2011)
statistics is shown in table -1, and illustrated in figure -1 and figure -2 (ITRC, 2007, 2008, 2009,
2010, 2011).
Year

Breaches No. of records

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

65
97
498
662
414

3,997,133
7,311,833
223,146,989
16,167,542
22,945,773

Table -1 Data breaches in organisations
662

700
600

498

500

414

400
300
200
100

65

97

Year 2007

Year 2008

0
Year 2009

Year 2010

Year 2011
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Figure -1 Number of data breaches
While the ITRC statistics (based on publicly reported cases only) point to the decrease in the
number of breaches, at the same time the increase in the number of records from each breach,
point to the increase in severity of the breach. The year 2009 is an exception since 206 million
records was breached from two cases alone (Heartland Payment and US Military of 130 and 76
million records respectively).
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Figure – 2 Number of records breached
The largest breach on record, the Heartland Payment Systems (a PCI DSS compliant
transaction processing company transacting US $ 80 billion) attack, was a technical one using
SQL injection through a vulnerability in the code written eight years ago for the web form. This
allowed access to Heartland‟s corporate network, according to Robert Russo, general manager of
the PCI Security Council (Vijayan 2010). This vulnerability was not identified through annual
internal and external audits of Heartland‟s systems or through continuous internal systemmonitoring procedures. This provided a means to extend the compromise from the corporate
network to the separate payment processing network (Cheney, 2010). The attack went unnoticed
for six months while the attackers continued their nefarious activities in the network. According
to Verizon 2011 report, 96% of the breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate
controls. A list of reported breaches in organisations (from January to August 2011) where more
than 100,000 records compromised (given in figure 3) is analyzed to find out the factors behind
the breaches which shed light on the issues to consider to provide a robust model of IS security
(source: ITRC, 2011).
Out of the 20 reported breaches, the largest of these was reported by TRICARE SAIC on Sept.
14. It happened when the backup tapes containing electronic health care records used in the
military health system to capture patient data from 1992 through Sept. 7, 2011, in San Antonioarea military treatment facilities was lost. Table 2 presents results based on the analyses of the
top twenty breaches, the type of breach and analysis.
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Oklahoma State Dept of Health

133,000

Laredo Independent School District

164,406

Accendo Insurance

175,000

Virginia Commonwealth University

176,567

San Fransisco Public Utilities Commission

180,000

Restaurant Depot

200,000

Massachussets Executive Office

210,000

South California Medical Legal Consultants

300,000

Cord Blood Registry

300,000

Citigroup

360,000

Cambridge Who's Who Publishing

400,000

Eisenover Medical Centre

514,000

Wellpoint Anthem

600,000

Oregon Department of Motor Vehicles

1,000,000

Nemours Children Health System

1,600,000

Jacobi Medical Centre

1,700,000

HealthNet - IBM

2,000,000

Betfar

2,300,000

Texas Comptroller

3,500,000

TRICARE-SAIC

4,900,000
-

2,000,000
4,000,000
Number of records compromised

6,000,000

Figure – 3 Data breach in various organisations reported in 2011

Organisation
1 TRICARE-SAIC
2 Texas Comptroller

Nature of breach

Evaluation

Backup tapes containing SAIC SAIC data
stolen from the car of a Tricare employee.
Unencrypted information transferred and
kept in a server accessible to the public

Non-technical – employee error;
procedure not followed
Correct procedure not followed when
transferring information across
servers
Technical breach, procedure not
followed especially network
segregation and file integrity
monitoring.
Appropriate policies and procedures
were not been followed by those
responsible for both the physical and
logical protection of critical data.

3 Betfair

SQL injection attack on a code
vulnerability

4 Health Net IBM

Nine server drives went missing from the
data centre of the California office of
Health Net
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5 Jacobi Medical
Centre

6 Nemours Children
Health System

7 Oregon
Department of
Motor Vehicles
8 WellPoint Anthem

9 Eisenhower
Medical Centre

10 Cambridge
Publishing

The files (cassette tapes in a box) was
stolen from a van operated by GRM
Information Management Services, when
the driver left the van unattended and
unlocked.
Unencrypted computer backup tapes
containing patient billing and employee
payroll data stolen from a Nemours facility
in Wilmington, Delaware
USB or CD containing personal
information lost from the department.
Thief caught.
A flaw in the website allowed hackers to
manipulate the web address within the site
to gain access to applicants' information.

The computer used to check-in patients at
the Center in Rancho Mirage was stolen
from the open lobby area

The data tapes was stolen or lost by an
outsourced company when the drive (with
the tape inside) was sent for repair to the
outsourced company
11 Citigroup
The attackers logged into Citi's consumer
website for credit-card holders using
legitimate accounts and they changed
characters in their Web browsers' address
fields to move around to new accounts.
Thereafter it was suspected that they
automated the process, writing a short
program to cycle through possible account
numbers and capture the data displayed in
the browser window for each one
(Wagenseil, 2011).
12 Cord Blood
A computer along with the backup tapes
Registry
containing member personal and financial
information were stolen from an
employee's locked car.
13 Southern California Personal medical data were available
Medical-Legal
online in an unsecured format and could be
Consultants
accessed through Internet searches.

14 Massachusetts
Executive Office

15 Restaurant Depot

Correct procedure not followed prior
to and when transporting storage
media

Correct procedure not followed when
storing storage media. As per the
control, the tapes were supposed to
be safely locked
Correct procedure were not followed
when storing/disposing redundant
data
An upgrade to the server caused the
vulnerability, but it was later
revealed that security measures were
not audited and validated for the
system
Correct procedure not followed. The
computer was not protected with any
sort of drive encryption mechanisms,
and not physically locked.
Correct auditing procedure not
followed when repairing storage
media. Tape kept inside the drive by
mistake.
Technical flaw. If the bank had used
a method other than the account
number to identify the account to the
browser, the breach could have been
avoided.

Correct procedure not followed when
storing/transporting storage media

Technical flaw. SCMLC President
admitted that their internal security
policies and procedures were not
followed (the website was not
password protected).
A variation of the persistent virus W 32.
Procedures on using portable storage
QAKBOT infected 1,500 computers at the devices, download of files and
agency‟s offices and career centers
clicking on suspicious web links
could have prevented the breach.
Hacking - cybercriminals placed malware Technical breach by expert hackers
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16 San Francisco
Public Utilities
Commission

onto the credit and debit card processing
systems used in Restaurant Depot's stores,
harvested the stolen data and sent it to a
server in Russia.
The incident involved a server housing
sensitive data got infected with malware. "
The server was open onto the Internet and
had an encoded file with customer data.

17 Virginia
Commonwealth
University

According to forensic reports hackers
accessed the system from an IP address
within US and planted malware on one
server (outside the firewall) which infected
another server (containing sensitive data
inside the firewall) and created two
accounts
18 Accendo Insurance Personal information may have been
exposed during mailings of transition fill
letters to physicians. While the mailings
were addressed correctly and received by
the recipients, a formatting change shifted
the text of the letters, showing some lines
of text through the envelope window.
19 Laredo Independent A disk holding personal information
School District
current and former students in the Laredo
Independent School District has gone
missing/lots in transit.
20 Oklahoma State
Dept of Health

Department laptop which contained client
personal information was stolen from the
car of OSDH‟s employee in broad
daylight.

Technical breach. Procedures were
not followed. It was speculated that
hackers might have injected malware
through an open port on the server .
The file was not encrypted and the
data was stored in plain text.
Technical breach. Breach discovered
on 24th October. Analysis still going
on regarding the cause

Non-technical error, attributed to
formatting of letters while drafting
and sent to printer

Non-technical error, when standard
encryption and data media transport
policy was not enforced. The school
doesn‟t know who has signed off the
disk to be sent.
Procedure not followed for transport
of electronic and storage devices
along public places. A Simple laptop
encryption software could have
mitigated the risk

Table -2 Analysis of the top twenty breaches
A review of these twenty cases reveal that sophisticated hacking took place only in four cases
(numbers 3, 15, 16 and 17) compromising only 20% of the cases with 13.73% of the 20.81
million records (in the top 20 listed in figure -3) breached. Technical error resulted in 15% of the
cases with 6.05% of total records breached. Compared to these two technical attacks, nontechnical errors (which could not have been prevented through normal network security
defenses) accounted for 65% of the cases with 80.22% of total records breached. This means that
13 out of 20 breaches or 16.6 million out of 20.81 million record breach could have been
prevented by implementing and following relevant IS security and governance controls.
Expanding the statistics from the sample of twenty cases to the entire 414 reported breaches,
reveal that breaches in 269 out of 414 organizations could have avoided. Converting this into
financial terms, the above figure and loss statistics of Ponemon Institute (2011) is taken for
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analysis. They estimated that the annualized cost of cybercrime to an organizations is $5.9
million per year (based on the median annualized cost for 50 benchmarked organizations); which
in the ITRC cases, amount to $1587 million (269.1 x $5.9 million) saved by following simple
procedures. If those organisations that had been breached, but not reported or veiled from public
have been included, the savings in US alone can be staggering. To evaluate whether this amount
($1587 million) is realistic another statistic is taken to compute the values. According to
Forrester Research, (Gaudin, 2007) the cost of breach of a record which includes outside legal
fees, notification costs, increased call center costs, marketing and PR costs, and discounted
product offers falls between $90 and $ 305. This amounts to (20.81 million x $90 - $ 305 = $
1872 to $ 6347 million (the conservative figure $ 1872 million comes close to the previous
calculated amount).
In a survey on UK business on IS security (by the UK Government Department for Business
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2008), it was revealed that
45% of the companies with less than 50 staff; 72% with more than 250 staff and 96% of the
companies with more than 500 staff have suffered a security incident in the previous year. This
comes to an average of 71% of companies being subjected to a security incident. Regarding the
cost of responding to an attack Ponemon Institute (2011) found that from 2010 to 2011, the time
and cost required to respond to security breaches has increased from 14 days in 2010 to 18 days
in 2011 with an average daily cost of attacks increasing from $17,600 to nearly $23,000.
Incorporating the PWC research statistics of 71% of the entire companies in UK having
experienced an attack to the tune of $17000 to $23000 the total amount spent/lost is staggering.
An overview of analysis of threats from various sources, reveal the extent of threat. In the year
2010 alone Symantec encountered more than 286 million unique variants of malware; 93%
increase in the volume of Web-based attacks in 2010 over the volume observed in 2009 and an
average of 260,000 identities exposed in each of the data breaches caused by hacking (Symantec,
2011). Symantec also reported a 42% rise in the number of reported new mobile operating
system vulnerabilities (from 115 to 163), 6253 new vulnerabilities, and 14 new zero day
vulnerabilities in applications such as Internet Explorer, Adobe Reader, and Adobe Flash Player.
The 2011 Verizon data breach investigation report conducted by the Verizon Risk team, the US
Secret Service and the Dutch High Tech Crime Unit reveals that most of the data breaches in
organizations in 2010 are not the result of highly sophisticated attacks, but rather the victims are
a target of opportunity than choice (Verizon, 2011). Moreover, according to Verizon almost all
breaches are avoidable without difficult or expensive corrective action. In the year 2010 Verizon
reported that 83% of victims were targets of opportunity, 92% of attacks were not highly
difficult, 76% of all data was compromised from servers, 86% were discovered by a third party,
96% of breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate controls, and 89% of victims
subject to PCI-DSS had not achieved compliance.
These points to the fact that implementing security mechanism alone is not sufficient to prevent
data breaches as technical, non-technical controls and best practices in information security and
governance is required to provide optimized rather than adequate protection. For instance, in the
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case of the Betfair data breach (Amsel, 2011), the forensic investigation report prepared by the
digital security consultants - Information Risk Management concluded that:
“Information security was not implemented in accordance with best practice …
appropriate information security governance is not in place within Betfair and as a
consequence the business has been exposed to significant risks … appropriate technical
controls relating to such elements as network segregation and file integrity monitoring
that would provide Betfair the ability to deter, prevent and detect such an incident are not
in place.”
To find out the reasons for the persistent attacks and weakness in IS security it is imperative to
look at the actual issues facing IS security managers from their perspective and get
recommendations/requirements for an efficient and effective security architecture.

3. Issues and Requirements in IS Security
Data breaches and hacking through carelessness in following procedures and controls have
emerged as a serious and growing issue in organisations and personal computers alike. Hence it
is worthwhile to look at the IS security issues facing organisations to substantiate this. Two
studies are taken for analysis, one a global study of 874 IS security certified professionals
worldwide, and the other a study of 623 US based IS security professional who re-ranked the
same issues (Knapp, Marshall, Rainer & Morrow, 2008). Both the surveys came up with a
ranked list of 25 information security issues (see table 3).
An analysis of the issues based on matching the issues in the top five in both the surveys reveal
top three common issues four issues namely:
i. Top management support
ii. Malware attacks like viruses, Trojans and worms
iii. User awareness and training
Here non-technical issues like top management support and, user awareness and training
comprise two third of the top three issues facing managers followed by malware attacks implying
the importance of these two issues in preventing malware attacks. Overall, the issues can be
categorized into technical, non-technical, and those that are both technical as well as nontechnical in nature (table – 4) that may reveal the extent of support that IT personnel personal
have to give to technical as well as non-technical issues in ensuring an effective IT security
environment.
The evaluation of the major issues supports the need for a broader perspective of IS security
incorporating IT governance (which includes all the non-technical issues, and some technical
issues given in table -4). This points to the need to look at IS security from a non- technical
perspective as well. This necessitates a review of IS security and governance controls available
and employed, to evaluate where these can fit into current IS security domain and to analyse the
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available IS security models to see how these can be integrated into an optimized IS security
governance framework
Global Study (874 respondents)
1 Top management support
2 User awareness training & education
3 Malware
4 Patch management
5 Vulnerability & risk management
6 Policy related issues (enforcement)
7 Organisational culture
8 Access control & identity management
9 Internal threats
10 Business continuity & disaster preparation
11 Low funding & inadequate budgets
12 Protection of privileged information
13 Network security architecture
14 Security training for IT staff
15 Justifying security expenditure
16 Inherent insecurity of networks & information systems
17 Governance
18 Legal & regulatory issues
19 External connectivity to organisational networks
20 Lack of skilled security workforce
21 Systems development & life cycle support
22 Fighting spam
23 Firewall & IDS configurations
24 Wireless vulnerabilities
25 Standards issues

US study (623 respondents)
1 Top management support
2 Legal & regulatory issues
3 Malware
4 User awareness training & education
5 Protection of privileged information
6 Business continuity & disaster preparation
7 Low funding & inadequate budgets
8 Lack of skilled security workforce
9 Fighting spam
10 Inherent insecurity of networks & information systems
11 Standards issues
12 Vulnerability & risk management
13 Policy related issues (enforcement)
14 Security training for IT staff
15 Governance
16 Patch management
17 Access control & identity management
18 Justifying security expenditure
19 Network security architecture
20 Organisational culture
21 Internal threats
22 Systems development & life cycle support
23 Wireless vulnerabilities
24 External connectivity to organisational networks
25 Firewall & IDS configurations

Table 3: A comparative study of IS security issues globally and in US
Technical
Malware
Patch management
Access control & identity mngmt
Network security architecture
Fighting spam
Firewall & IDS configurations
Wireless vulnerabilities

Non-technical
Top management support
User awareness training & education
Policy related issues (enforcement)
Organisational culture
Business continuity & disaster
preparation
Low funding & inadequate budgets

Both
Vulnerability & risk management
Internal threats
Protection of privileged information
Inherent insecurity of networks &
information systems
External connectivity to
organisational networks
Systems development & life cycle
support

Security training for IT staff
Justifying security expenditure
Governance
Legal & regulatory issues
Lack of skilled security workforce
Standards issues

Table 4: Differentiating between technical and non-technical issues in IS security
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4. Optimized Perspective of IS Security
The term „optimal‟ refers to the relevant components of „requirements‟ and „dimensions‟ for an
organisation thus creating a synergic (multiple) effect through mapping and appropriate
integration. IS security problems cost millions of dollars for US companies and billions for the
overall US economy and the question is not whether organizations need more security, but to
look at cost-benefit methods to evaluate IT security to „optimize‟ security countermeasure
investments and reduce spending without sacrificing protection (Arora, et al., 2004).
Incorporating the requirements and dimensions of information systems security effectiveness
results in an optimized information security governance model
Requirements

Methods to achieve this requirement

1

Be holistic and encompassing

2

Make suggestions on how different
controls can be synchronised to
achieve maximum effect
Include a comprehensive approach
to information security risk
management
Follow a predetermined life-cycle
approach

3

4

5

Be measurable

Incorporate and integrate industry relevant security and IT
governance frameworks
Synchronization can be achieved through mapping the
different controls to achieve a synergic effect.
Using risk management framework like the RiskIT approach
by ISACA
Apply a PDCA cycle as stated in ISO 27001. ISO IEC 27001
uses the Plan-Do-Check-Act model. Plan in section - 4, Do in
section -5, Check in section – 6 and 7, Act in section – 8.
Using multi-dimensional measurement methods instead of just
a tick it approach. According to CSI Computer Crime and
Security Survey 2010/2011 (2011), many respondents named
tools that would improve their visibility—better log
management, security information and event management,
security data visualization, security dashboards and the like.

Table – 5: IS Security Architecture
The high incidence of security breaches in organizations could be attributed to the organization‟s
inability to adequately focus on non-technical issues in information systems security, namely
policies, procedures, practices, and strategies that, organizations normally put in place to
minimize threats (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001; Straub and Welke 1998; and Siponen, 2005
cited in Ifendo, 2009). This necessitates an ever increasing need to manage IS security from a
multidimensional, holistic and comprehensive manner for ensuring a secure IS environment
(Solms, 2001). Moreover IS security need to be built like a staircase of combined measures
(Hagen, Albrechtsen and Howden, 2008) as various dimensions of IS security are mutually
dependent on each other (Sundt, 2006; Berghel, 2005 cited in Hagen, Albrechtsen and Howden,
2008). Elof & Elof, (2005) have proposed an integrated architectural approach to information
and computer security that operates in a distributed, heterogeneous and multidisciplinary
business environment. They have given five requirements for the architecture (table -5):
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From the breaches mentioned in section - 1 it is evident that a security awareness culture and use
of appropriate success factors implementing relevant frameworks is lacking in the affected
organisations. This necessitates the need for extended requirements to include a security culture
and implementation success factors. Researchers have proposed a information security-aware
culture to minimise risks to information (Veiga & Elof, 2010; Niekerk & Solms, 2010). Hence,
an additional requirement (requirement -6) is to create and implement a continuous organisation
specific dynamic security awareness and training program. While frameworks are in itself best
practices for implementing IS security standards and complying with regulations, proper
implementation is required to make the model successful. The data breaches and attacks have
proved that despite the presence of IS security and governance frameworks, breaches have
happened (Eg: Heartland Payment Systems Breach the largest breach reported since 2008 was
PCI DSS compliant and certified). This requires following industry specific critical success
factors and best practices in implementation (requirement – 7) of relevant standards. Success
factors have been proposed for IT governance implementation namely the 33 ITG best practices
(Grembergen and Haes, 2009) and ITIL best practices (Pederson et. al., 2010; Iden &
Langeland, 2010, Tan, Cater-Steel & Toleman, 2009).
Elof & Elof (2005) regard IS security as a multidisciplinary concept cutting across several
related disciplines. In this respect Solms (2001, p. 504) stated that “if information security is not
addressed in a holistic and comprehensive way, taking all its dimensions into account, real risks
exist preventing a really secure environment”. In this respect, Solms proposed a
multidimensional character of information security, incorporating twelve dimensions focusing on
governance, audit, legal, technical, human and measurement areas that need to work together for
creating a secure IS environment.
Table 6 illustrates the 12 dimensions and the corresponding frameworks/models/acts. In a global
survey on 834 business executives and heads of information technology (IT) covering 21
countries and 10 industries on the control frameworks used in enterprise governance of IT, 28%
of those surveyed use ITIL/ISO 20000, 21.1% use ISO 27000/related security frameworks,
15.1% use Six Sigma, 12.9% use COBIT, 12.7% use PMI/PMBOK, and 12% use RiskIT
framework of Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), along with other
frameworks (ITGI, 2011). Out of these, only Six Sigma and PMI/PMBOK are less oriented
towards IT security and governance. While the above controls are IT governance oriented
encompassing IT security, PCI DSS is a standard focusing purely on the technical aspects of
information technology focusing on protecting cardholder data.
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Dimensions
Strategic/corporate
governance

Available frameworks
Commonly used frameworks are ITIL/ISO 20000, ISO 27000 and
related security frameworks, Six Sigma, COBIT, PMI/PMBOK,
RiskIT, and other related frameworks (ITGI, 2011)

Governance/
organisational
Policy
Best practice

Evident in the four domains of COBIT and encompass the IS in the
organisation
IS Security policy endorsed in COBIT, ISO 27K series, NIST, ITIL
33 ITG best practices (Grembergen and Haes, 2009); ITIL best practices
(Pederson et. al., 2010; Iden & Langeland, 2010)
Extended Information Systems Secure Interconnection (ISSI) model (Leiwo
& Heikkuri, 1998) address the ethical aspect of IS security
Certifications available for COBIT, ITIL, ISO
Regulations like FISMA, HIPAA, SOX relate to IS security
(Relevant only for insurance companies )
Taken care of in relevant section/controls in COBIT, ITIL, ISO 27002
controls

Ethical
Certification
Legal
Insurance
Personnel/human
resource
Awareness

Information Security Culture Framework (Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Schlienger
& Teufel, 2003)
PCI DSS 2.0 & ITIL are more technical in nature than COBIT
Technical
Measurement/metrics Guidelines given in COBIT, ISO 27004 & ITIL – as metrics, goals, key
performance indicators, key goals indicators, and maturity model in COBIT.
COBIT is an IS audit tool. Moreover European Union selected COBIT as an
Audit
auditing standard for IT Security (Summerfield, 2005)

Table – 6: Dimensions of IS security mapped with related IS control frameworks/standards

5. Role of Governance in IS Security
Since IT governance is an integral part of IT Secuirity (Elof & Elof, 2005; Solms, 2001), the
definition and management of IT security is analysed to view its role. Information security
management is defined as “the process of administering people, policies, and programs with the
objective of assuring continuity of operations while maintaining strategic alignment with the
organisational mission” (Cazemer et al. 2000, cited in Choobineh, et al., p. 959) while the
management of information security is primarily concerned with strategic, tactical, and
operational issues surrounding the planning, analysis, design, implementation and maintenance
of the IS security program (Choobineh, Dhillon, Grimaila & Rees, 2007). The definition and
management not only provides a very broad meaning taking into account technical, nontechnical and strategic aspects of IS security, it emphasizes maintaining the IS operations with
the objective of IS security management as being strategic alignment in nature. This strategic
alignment of linking IS security mission and goals with the organizational strategic mission and
goals is the prime objective of IT governance. Moreover, in a global survey of 7000 IT
professionals, the importance of strategic alignment of organisational goals with the IT goals was
cited by 90% of the surveyed as vital to organisation (ITGI, 2006; ITGI, 2008). Thus it can be
safely assumed that the effective implementation of information security involves, using a
strategic mix of the IT governance frameworks, (that aligns the IT goals with the organisational
13

goals), IT service management framework (that maintain efficient and effective continuity of
operations), along with compliance with relevant security standards (policies and programs).
While it has been emphasised that governance is a key to success in setting standards, success is
more likely if the governance structure includes all of the various interests in the network, and
moreover the standards (ex. ISO 27 K, PCI DSS, ISO 20000) themselves need to be effective yet
flexible enough to satisfy competitive interests (Sullivan, 2010). In this respect Solms (2001, p.
504) have argued that “if information security is not addressed in a holistic and comprehensive
way, taking all its dimensions into account, real risks exist preventing a really secure
environment”. The effective and efficient utilization of information technology requires the
alignment of the IT strategies with the business strategies (Luftman, Lewis & Oldach, 1993;
Luftman & Brier, 1999). Since alignment of IT strategies with the business strategies is the
objective of IT governance, it is worthwhile to view security from an IT governance lens taking
into account the internal and external issues that impact IS security. In this respect, information
security should not be perceived as a technical issue alone, but as a business and governance
challenge that involves adequate risk management, reporting, and accountability. Thus apart
from securing information systems assets organisations have the extra role of complying with
mandatory and voluntary standard and regulations imposed by external entities. Hence it is
worthwhile to view IS security from a compliance and assurance perspective. According to
Bishop (2003) security has three components namely requirements, policy and mechanisms.
Ponemon Institute‟s (2011) study of 160 senior managers in a sample of 46 multinational
organizations revealed that the average cost of compliance was $3,529,570 while the cost
incurred due to non-compliance was $9,368,351. This amounted to a net savings of $ 5,838,781
($9,368,351-$3,529,570) for compliant companies. Thus, the non-compliance cost is 2.65 times
the cost of compliance. Since compliance to a variety of information security standards is
mandated by regulations, organisations need to act and implement a proactive information
security enforcement strategy (Madan & Madan, 2010).

6. IT Control Frameworks for IS Security
Information Security Governance, which is an important component of the IT governance and an
integral part of the enterprise governance, could be regarded as implementing the governance
concepts and principles on information security issues (Abu-Musa, 2010) (ibid). While a “control
framework is a recognised system of control categories that covers all internal controls expected
in an organisation” (IIARF 2002, cited in Liu & Ridley, 2005, p. 2), an internal control provides
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the area of effectiveness and
efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with regulations
(Pathak, 2003). Internal controls are policies, procedures, practices, and organisational structures
put in place to reduce risks (Kim, et al., 2008). Currently implementations of IS control
frameworks are on the rise worldwide, due to compliance and regulatory requirements to various
regulations and standards.
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In a survey of security professionals, the Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG) discovered that 72
percent of North American organizations with 1,000 or more employees have implemented one
or more formal IT best-practice control and process models (Turner et al., 2009). Among these,
the study stated that the most widely used commercial IT control frameworks are ITIL, ISO
27002 and COBIT, which provide optimal security management. Furthermore, it had been stated
that ISO/IEC 27002, COBIT, ISO 20000, and ITIL are the most applicable and widely used
standards to manage and maintain IT services (Sahibudin, Sharifi & Ayat, 2009). IT control
implementers use, ITIL to define strategies, plans and processes, COBIT for metrics,
benchmarks and audits and, ISO/IEC 27002 to address security issues to mitigate the risks (ibid).
Considering the more technical security aspects of protecting cardholder data, the requirements
set by PCI DSS are in line with the IT security best practices required by widely recognised
standards such as ISO 27002, and COBIT (Laredo, 2009). Gikas (2010) did a mapping of ISO
27000 with the PCI DSS and found out 70 similar technical controls between these two
standards. PCI DSS is a regulatory requirement that is mandatory for those dealing with credit
cards to ensure the protection of cardholder data; ISO 27002 is a non-regulatory code of practice
for information security (ISO, 2011); and ISO/IEC 20000 (an internal requirement), is the first
international standard for IT Service Management implemented through ITIL. On the other hand,
COBIT address the business issues namely company-wide principles, goals and needs in terms of
information processing through its various controls in the four domains of IS (Humphreys et al.,
cited in Posthumous & Solms, 2004). In the case of a risk-based approach to IS security, ISACA
has released the Risk IT Framework (ISACA, 2009) as a framework to identify, govern and
manage information technology risks. This framework fills the gap between generic (non–technical)
risk management frameworks and technical (security-related) IT risk management frameworks.

7. Optimized IS Security Governance (ISSG) Implementation Model
An optimized IS security governance model takes into account the following (based on mapping
the overlapped extended requirements outlined in table 5 and dimensions in table 6):
1. A holistic approach to IS security incorporating the comprehensive non-technical aspects
of corporate/IS governance encompassing the entire IS in the organisation, as well as
technical enough to ensure layered and detailed protection to organisational information
assets;
2. An effective and ethical IS security policy that complies with the legal and regulatory
requirements;
3. Synchronizing and mapping relevant IS security and governance control frameworks for
efficiency, effectiveness and synergy;
4. Viewing IT governance security from a risk based perspective using the Risk IT
framework or similar approach;
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5. Following a life cycle approach to implementation incorporating industry specific
dynamic success factors before, during and after implementation
6. Making sure that the people involved in IT and business share a common security culture
through continuous multi-level optimally crafted technical and non-technical training.
7. A multilevel multidimensional aggregated dashboard for tracking and monitoring IS
security governance entities using more than one metric.
IS security governance is an ongoing process due to external factors like the dynamic nature of
security threats, technological advances and changes/introduction of IS related regulations and
internal factors namely the dynamic change in strategic direction, change/update of IS assets,
and personnel movement and turnover. Thus, a dynamic process model is preferred to a static
model. Based on the seven components, the Figure – 6 provides the process of implementing the
optimized ISSG model.
COBIT for ITG, ITIL for
ITSM aligned with ISO
20000, ISO 27 K for
security, PCI DSS for
information protection;
and relevant frameworks.
Use Risk IT framework
to complement COBIT

Integrate by mapping
with each other; ensure
full coverage & depth;
use detailed guidelines
& mapping templates
given in COBIT like
RACI use information
criteria of CIA triangle

Process

PLAN: Select
appropriate
frameworks,
standards using risk
based approach

DO: Implement/
integrate / maintain
frameworks/
standards

Method

 Use industry standard CSF/best practices for implementing frameworks and for compliance
 Conduct continuous intermittent training (technical and awareness ) for all IT and non IT staff

Tools

Use a range of
measurement tools in
parallel for different
levels of dashboards:
maturity models, KPI,
KGI, customized metrics,
rating scale, heat map,
BSC and compliance

CHECK: Monitor,
measure the
effectiveness of
controls

Use automated multidimensional measurement
tools for getting historical
inputs for planning. Use
trend analysis/reports for
future planning; use external
scanning tools to update
security model

ACT: Modify, update
controls based on
internal feedback and
changes in business
environment

Figure -4 ISSG Implementation Process Model
The central focus of the security model is to manage IS security risk through a risk- based
approach. Since the IS security and governance domain includes different frameworks that
overlap there are hundreds of controls to choose from that may put undue burden on the
organisation in terms of cost, effort and time. Hence, a prioritized systematic approach of
choosing controls is preferred (figure – 8), as the objective is to use an optimized set of control
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rather than maximum controls, since 100% IS security is an utopian thought. The ISSG model
thus rides on:
 a common set of mandatory controls,
followed by,
 a set of heavily overlapped critical controls,
 a set of partially overlapped industry benchmarked controls,
 a set of recommended controls and
 a set of preferred controls.

Figure – 5: Prioritized IS Control Implementation
The ISSG process model should initially focus mainly on the mandatory controls for regulatory
compliance and then based on the industry and strategic direction, choose to follow other set of
controls. Financial sector may choose to follow all the set of controls listed below while
organisation in the hospitality sector may choose to follow the mandatory and critical controls
only. Since, controls are common across frameworks and levels, these five sets of controls can
again overlap with each other presenting a final set of customized controls.
IS security governance is continuous process due to the highly dynamic nature of the information
technology sector and the advances made by IS security defense technologies and hackers alike.
ISO 27001 reiterates this and incorporates several Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycles where the
IS controls are regarded as a continuous activity that is reviewed and adjusted to take account of
changes in the security threats, vulnerabilities and impacts of information security failures. Thus,
the implementation process of ISSG follows the PDCA cycle of Deming where relevant
frameworks/standards followed by appropriate controls are selected followed by mapping and
prioritizing the selected controls taking into account the overlap. The implementation step takes
into account the guidelines provided by the frameworks for implementation and optimal
integration.
Measurement being a requirement for effective security governance, COBIT provides a set of
tools and techniques for measurement of controls ranging from a simple compliance (complaint
and non-complaint), key performance/goal indicators (using quantitative scales), maturity model
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and the balance score card (BSC). Other measurements used are the heat map (red-amber-green)
and rating scale. A continuous approach of monitoring involves the use of automated tools to
record results from measurement on a continual basis to view the trend and take corrective action
and an external monitoring tool that provides suggestions on continuous improvement of the
ISSG model. The proposed model being conceptual in nature is not without its limitations.
Hence, the validation of the model through empirical research (case studies) in different contexts
and sectors is required to validate it.

8. Conclusion
Incidents, experiences and technological advances have proved that it is not possible to ensure a
100% secure IS network in an organisation. The practical option is to ensure optimal IS security
rather than adequate or maximum IS security. This can be achieved through the use of carefully
selecting relevant IS control from all domain of IS, prioritize and integrate them to avoid
duplication and implement them as a continuous cyclical process taking into account the
dynamic nature of technical advances in IS defense, threat, and the dynamic nature of the
organisational external and internal environment. This ensures a holistic perspective of IS
security governance through a risk based approach; ensure continuous monitoring through multi
measurement tools; and monitor the internal and external trends for continuous improvement of
the model. Generalization of this model requires validation through empirical research (case
studies) in different sectors of the industry and in different geographical locations.
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